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Abstract 
The EU has undergone through hard times in the ICT industry on which it has achieved the worldwide reputation through the rise 
of Nokia. While Apple and Google have fortified their global equities through total innovation vertically. This article makes clear 
the following policy implications by analyzing the "Framework Program of EU" which may work as organic link building for 
regaining its impaired reputation in the mobile industry. Fristly, it may be required to implement public policy for providing 
ecosystem-infrastructure fo  focused policy is fully taking into account the relative impact of 
 studies as a innovation epicenter" for U.S. by comparing with the economic focus of scale in enhancing the 
competence of mobile industry. Secondly, the innovation edge for technology cooperation between the public policy and 
corporate strategy in pan-EU will be increased on R&D intensive for Korea, which has built the strong foundation in the IT 
specialization, it makes enable the corporate strategy geared to growth as a means of achieving its vertical specialization with the 
EU. 
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1. Introduction 
The background of innovation in Finland who brought growth to the world class company Nokia was the 
initiative telecommunication terminal equipment of Ericsson plc. in Sweden, with who it has improved to compete 
with Ericsson. So we define it as the first factor of growth. Until 1990, Finland was recognised as the area of 
reindeer and cold lake with northern light in Northern European countries, who was an independent nation from 
colony of its neighbouring countries. However, since 1998 Finland has proselytised to the new industry-leading 
country which became a birthplace of IT and built a strong nation of mobile industries like Nokia named one of the 
world  most innovation companies. It was possible to achieve the adoption of GSM digital mobile technology as 
the EU has allocated a certain communication frequency into European companies so that results in growing in the 
world. In the process of innovation policy of European, Nokia had gotten GSM system from EU. Therefore, during 
 
* Corresponding Author name. Tel.: +82-10-9000-9855 
   E-mail address: dais3s@gmail.com. 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Huseyin Arasli
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer review under responsibility of Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Arasli
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
596   Daesung Seo and Hae-du Hwang /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  62 ( 2012 )  595 – 601 
the past decade it has maintained a strong sustainable growth with recording more than 38% of global market share 
for mobile devices each year. But since Apple has launched smartphone iPhone and tablet PC iPad in 2008, it has 
entered a new phase of evolution in the mobile industry by falling below 22% of its overall mobile phone market 
share.  
Europe's innovation policy needs to reflect on the private sector in market through comparing the key R&D 
investment of industries or emerging markets, interests in attracting industrial investments on insides, i.e. 
traditionally German
slightly in Germany and France were some reason for scale and focus on automobiles. Besides, emerging areas did 
not have the traditional growing industries like Germany in the case of Central Eastern European countries that 
public expenditure on R&D investment was relatively small, low intensity of R&D because the private companies 
have no support for the infant industry from their own government. On basis of previous studies in this paper, it was 
analysed and broadly separated by both corporate strategy and public policy in order to identify the problems which 
have happened through the evolution of innovation policy in Europe. The gap between the EU and U.S. investment 
in R&D intensive is to be analysed by the impact on showing the differences for their own innovation edge. 
2. The corporate strategy and public policy on R&D of mobile industries 
2.1. Previous Studies on R&D policy of the EU  
Jaumotte & Pain (2005) emphasised that the direction of EU's R&D public policy did not clearly and government 
has increased the overall rate of R&D with enlarging its range so that it could result in lowering relatively the 
intensive rate of R&D on IT fields. Through the researches for 17 years of Erken & Van Es (2007), they had 
analysed the difference among the corporate R&D activities of 36 sectors in 14 countries of EU and US. R&D 
investment in terms of sectorial distribution of configuration was very smaller the gap in the EU than the US while 
company's R&D investment depended on R&D expenditure having a substantial effect. Particularly in case of US 
corporates have concentrated on investing the ICT related industries including mobile devices. By using such 
comparison, Moncada- -Castello et al. (2010) saw that the purpose of R&D intensity was the same as that of 
the public policy section. It has significantly to perform bet
analysis and impact. 
EU Commission on R&D projects has much focused on biased policy like the environment, nanotechnology, etc. 
regardless of the commercial sectors for the current profitability owing to the European integration and long-term 
investment goals. However, Europe's corporate strategy at high-tech has built the way of direct investment in the 
joint venture field, one at low-tech built the other way of global pool resourcing which seems to be short-term 
profitability of the investment. As the failure of the adjustment between government policies and corporate 
strategies occurred through interaction, it is increasing the question on the effectiveness of innovation policy in 
Europe of the last 20 years. The proximate cause (first cause) of these events was generated by product innovations. 
But in terms of ultimate cause (second cause), there were problems facing the EU policy speed for innovation. It 
mentions the following; firstly, growth in Europe was relatively low. Secondly, it makes low investments in R&D or 
insufficient use of ICT, market barriers to accessibility of it. Thirdly, it was the reduction of R&D budget due to 
southern Europe's financial crisis. 
2.2. Corporate strategy and  changes on R&D focused policy 
In the 1980s popularized to the mobile communications enabling new market, Sweden's Ericsson and Motorola in 
the U.S. they should be competed against each other in order to become the winner of the world (global champion) 
of market. In 2011, however Google in the United States acquired to Motorola Mobility who had over 80-year 
history of mobile phone innovation. Due to rapid market changes of mobile devices they led to make M&A between 
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hardware manufacturer and OS software firm in order to avoid overlapping realm of their own innovation and 
overcome their own weakness and keep abreast with international competitiveness on both fields.  
 In the 1980s internet innovation in U.S. has penetrated the markets of Mini-Tel in France with the PC terminal toe 
be accessible Internet. In 2010, by another aftershock, iPhone equipped with easy multi-touch system for internet 
has attacked Nokia on the smartphone market shares.  Currently European government strives to reestablish policies 
for regaining missed opportunities in the mobile industry like done in 1980s actually. At that time, it was possible to 
overcome the crisis of ICT in Europe as letting Nokia develop naturally in thanks to the co-effect of the European 
 it. EU presented the basic policies on the R&D strategic plan through the Lisbon 
summit in 2000. Then in order to establish the objectives of ERA (European Research Area) in 2004, EU 
strengthened the construction of the following: Firstly, building research capacity in university, secondly 
conjunction and coordination the R&D program, thirdly enforcement of R&D infrastructure, fourthly enhanced 
researchers moving, fifthly spreading knowledge, sixthly global open labs in R&D. by the initial R&D policy in EU 
was to build the world largest single R&D program, since implementing the First framework program in 1984, up to 
now come to the seventh framework program. This program began from occurring problems about the weakening of 
Europe's ICT industry due to the program-to-duplicate or different product standards between countries. The relative 
weakness to investment in ICT within Europe seems also to be related to labor market regulation (Nicholas 2003). 
Furthermore, in proportion to the industrial partnership including the United States and Japan progresses, Major 
European companies such as Siemens and Philips have made of industrial cooperation with the follow-up 
procedures to solve problems of the increased dependence on foreign firms, which Joint research programs 
(ESPRIT) in addition of FP was performed. These policies of industry-collaborative research program among 
countries were enable integration as EUREKA, ESF, E/T, etc. that had also supported them for venture capital 
investment. 
Based on these EU policies it has grown leading mobile industry companies like Nokia, UK ARM, Sweden 
TeliaSonera involved LTE, etc. ARM processors get still supported from EU funded projects. As the Lisbon 
xt 10 years is targeted on 
increasing an overall R&D investment to 3% of GDP. The environment, the renewable energy use, the education, 
the employment improving, the social integration etc. they are also presented in the strategy, of which generate 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the EU. Based on this, Consistency within the EU to lead the R&D 
innovation was strengthening technical partnerships in Central Eastern Europe to the third world through 
international joint research (FP, Joint Call, Intergovernmental, SF). 
However, because it was adjusting the policies at existing national or European level for the innovation program 
in solving optimization problems of European-wide R&D. Researchers have pointed out that it was not clear how 
much the current policy impacts performance compared to the initial, or later commercialization of FP research. 
Companies are missing out on millions of Euros of FP7 funding and therefore investing less in R&D. UK firms 
spent less on R&D than either Germany or France. 
 the 2008 recession, budget spending on R&D by businesses went down by over 
rms cutting back. 
It will make them far too difficult for new conception of FP to move from the laboratory to the marketplace. 
Public policies are not a good innovator, but they suggest the surge in corporate market that will stand in near future. 
Despite the EU commission invests on funds in R&D, a lot of the budgets are not clear really to achieve more 
dexterous ICT. Some FP goes just into the academic research that it is not enough to develop global competence.  
3. The Epicentre of product convergence and Innovation discontinuity 
3.1. European Perspectives 
Almost IT industry is trying to accelerate commercial development at the epicentre of product innovation. The 
relevant firms have decided to adapt the origin innovation and how to make something new goods. The following 
example is to present that the impact of Europe on the competitive edge of mobile industries. 
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Firstly the impact of innovation epicenter in the 1980s, As Coccia (2004) presented that the innovation intensity, 
at a spatial level greater from the area where innovation is born (so-called innovation epicenter), it divides the 
telecom terminal history by the PC internet innovation into two phases; a pre-internet phase and a post-internet 
about the impact in Europe. Mini-Tel referred to terminals in France was used as a means of communication like 
only special characters and simple graphics from the 1980s. However, since the mid-1990s it has been replaced by 
the Internet PC including complex graphics to transmit information rapidly. Mini-Tel makes French entry into the 
world's leading information and communication country, but due to IT revolution it currently is being treated like a 
dinosaur in the Internet age. Limitations of communication and information technology devices had so caused as a 
result of unable to wake Internet technology that had led to the crisis of ICT industry in Europe. 
In 1984 as a way of integrating R&D between the corporate and public sector in European, getting started the 
first Framework Program also was caused by a weakening of ICT industry among Europe nations. And according to 
increasing dependence on the technology generated by industrial partnerships such as the United States and Japan, 
they have resulted in an increase in cooperation between industries like Siemens, Philips, Thomson, etc. 
Secondly in 2008, it divides the history of the smartphone into two phases at innovation epicenter through 
technology convergence: a pre-iPhone phase and a post-iPhone. The United States in 2008, Apple Inc. has met a 
sudden surge in demand for developing new smart mobile devices. While Nokia of Europe has eroded market 
demand to drive the whole world. Apple's iPhone with easy to use and free high-speed Internet and to use the touch 
 using relatively slow-speed and expensive Internets. 
Besides based global cooperative software with mobile developers, emerging market for mobile applications has 
brought a wave of changes.  
How fast the government can react against wavelengths derived from the epicentre of technology innovation or 
move speed to keep pace with the need of their customers. Weber et al. (2011) explained that in the early days of the 
mobile Internet in Europe, these differences in the approaches had severe consequences: The reliance on an open 
standard in which many parties could influence the decision over technological choices led to be introduced contents 
before compatible handsets were brought to the market and to handsets which regularly failed to display contents. 
3.2. Lessons from the Mobile industry of the EU for Korea 
In 1994, Nokia was new market disrupter. The dominant global provider of mobile handsets was Motorola, its 
shares were trading at an all-time high and it was seen as an outstanding innovator. By 2000, Motorola
-leading 31%. Nokia had won 
by promising communicating, consistently delivering, and improving straightforward relentlessly, relevant customer 
benefits, while Apple has been exploiting the benefits as form of direct investments just since 2006. Here was 
configured as the external developer ecosystem, which could be larger the scale of development than other 
competitors. int of view that the resurgence of Apple was from 
growing global ecosystem for complementary innovation and providing relevant grafting the easy availability of 
internet technology. Lo (2011) pointed out that Apple had launched a new competitive and innovative product 
through outsourcing of R&D investment (annual $ 1,700,008,000) rather than direct investment in advanced 
technology sectors. While Nokia has highly invested 4 billion dollars almost a third of the total investments on 
Symbian or Meego of OS software platform like sort of direct investments in joint venture field. It became a sunk 
cost as abandoning unofficially installation of the Symbian. 
Nokia eventually lost some of its ability to stay lasting and adapting early market trends. In particular, just as 
Motorola missed the right time to switch to digital, Nokia failed to find that the long-heralded mobile Internet was a 
practical option later. In 2004, three years before the iPhone launched, it rejected a proposal to develop a Nokia 
online applications store (Patrick 2011). It can be explained that Korean government and firm responses in the 
earlier stage as it seemed to be waiting and seeing attitudes on the disconnected ICT industry why they considered 
as one of strong ICT nations. At last booming for iPhone of Korean customer  demand, government and IT firms   
have to rush to build the solution of the fast follower strategy for it. For instance, policymakers despite the criticism 
have long neglected the issue of unfair revenue-sharing practices between carriers and content providers for digital 
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content and data service (Lee 2008). The iPhone shock would end up being a storm in a teacup and the much-talked 
about power shift in the mobile handset ecosystem resulting from it would lead to nothing more than a cosmetic 
change in Korea (Kim 2008). The iPhone brings with it enormous challenges to the mobile service operators, 
handset manufacturers, software developers, policymakers, and general users. It may not be farfetched to argue that 
the future of mobile telecommunications in Korea depends on lessons learned from the iPhone shock and the actions 
taken in response. In Korea, although the domestic sales about iPhone with innovation technology tried to begin in 
2008, it was enforced repeatedly with delaying the rollout by November 2009. There is one reason, the lasting 
bureaucratic regulatory over the location-based services (LBS) available through built-in mapping apps in the 
iPhone (Ramstad & Woo 2009). 
 The initial going-it-along strategy was a serious level in the internet field. Japan had such experience like why its 
mobile phones h  in the 1990s, Japan policymaker set the standard of the second-
generation network that had not adopted Then t d 
also been severed from the global market. In case of Japanese failure this implies that there is no guaranteed 
advantage held upon local firms by domestic test bed markets, only that they can confer a potential strategic 
opportunity. After iPhone shock the Korean market in spite of the test bed dynamics might plunge into the decline 
on mobile industries, even the wide recognition of the value of the services and products. But Korean consumers 
were in rather high demand in a speed to market product. It helped make both the policy and corporate strategy 
change to prevent the decline of mobile industry by local test bed demand for export market. It means better to take 
rapid responses than a significant consideration by them on the mobile related innovation market.  
Therefore, for the speed responsive on it, MNEs like Samsung are rather having the test bed market at several key 
cities in the world than keeping only Korean test bed market.  the reason why they must participate in 
collaboration of joint researches with a lot of test bed markets. Joint research projects like FP in EU innovation 
policy could be a good example role if they need more to intensify at. The research of test bed markets is focused on 
commercialization further developing it. In the process, it should be able to arrange ecological infrastructure, by 
Increasing their intensity and investment on researches through the test bed market Korean firms were to step out of 
a faster verification process, which could be overcome academic failure of Innovation policy. Even though Apple 
was in an epicenter of innovation, for its sustainable growth, it should be followed in conjunction with the 
subsequent product launch and supporting investment policy in spite of a high intensive R&D and well designed test 
bed-infrastructure. 
3.3. The Role of Government and the R&D intensive 
Although the role of corporate is a key to dealing with the innovation shock which came from the epicenter of it, 
government should also check the directions of innovation. A leader like Nokia or fast follower like Samsung has 
led to product innovation, however this article say that long-term R&D intensive by policy affects building 
ecosystem-infrastructure. 
Even though Nokia has a strong point to meet changing consumer tastes in more than 100 new products launches 
worldwide each year, the failure cause of Nokia's global market in 2010 was the result of lost opportunities, which 
have been deprived of attracting huge participation of mobile software (application) developers, i.e. Enterprise could 
not build Innovation ecosystem coming from the global cooperation to accommodate new applications in due time. 
This global cooperation implies that R&D policies in Europe may need to support together. But EU research funding 
is making a massive contribution to quality of Europe life like a few fields in medicine, energy and nanotechnology. 
After analyzing the report as the table 1
35% and United States 69% in the higher technology field, EU has remarkably fallen behind at sectors of ICT, BT, 
etc. than U.S. for last 5 years. Eco-infrastructure development per sector was needed to require specific expansion. 
For more creating technology start-up companies or a good epicenter in established firms, they should turn into the 
way for making innovation. But public policies about inconsistent intensity of R&D make easy to be happened 
funding gap among the UK, French and Swedish, etc. 
Table 1.   intensive per sectorial fields between the EU and United States 
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Most R&D intensive (>10%) or other    Overall R&D intensity(%) Epicenter (more frequently) 
Semiconductors, Software, Telecom equip, Internet 17,358.0 43,440.6     56.1 US 
Automobiles & parts, Chemicals 34,447.3 13,353.1       8.1 EU 
Electronic equip, Computer hardware, Bio-techno 1,922.5 15,923.6 25.5 US 
Aerospace & defense, Pharmaceuticals 27,552.2 31,503.2 19.3 EU vs. US 
Source: The 2010 EU Industrial R&D Investment Scoreboard. 
4.  Conclusion and Policy Implication 
ion policy makers need to provide the existing or emerging program (FP, CIP, etc.) by engaging 
more deeply with companies in order to overcome the crisis of discontinuity in the mobile industry and Nokia. 
Software development unlike hardware is to be creating a culture of global user interface, beyond pure academic 
researches (heuristic value), from basic science knowledge to applied science it is necessary to construct a long-term 
global ecosystem-infrastructure that makes industrialization for a pathway to innovation epicenter through 
technology convergence. Germany and France have built the traditional automotive ecosystem of industrial R&D, 
Finland and Sweden built IT hardware. They all have higher intensive R&D than in other nations, while other 
European small countries have lower the intensive R&D to sectorial distribution of company configuration, which 
are biased on the relevant industry on IT hardware compared with automotive in the global market of rapid mobile 
culture for the test bed infrastructure. 
EU policy makers in terms of technological innovation and marketing is now watching Korean for the 
international R&D cooperation and research infrastructure who has strengths of mobile devices equipped with the IT 
sector, etc. Toward speed activation policies about the vulnerable software industry it has also been working with 
U.S. companies. In mobile software for research, it is important to build the gradual and continuous international 
cooperation for the both EU and Korea to avoid short-term development projects. Otherwise in order to strengthen 
the competitiveness, EU has to quickly responsive to the scale focusing of R&D for IT software industries and more 
established innovation cooperation with Korea. 
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